

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
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NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, PARM, MNUC

SUBJECT: ERW: FURTHER ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS
REF: USNATO 02125 (011733Z MAR 78)

1. THIS CABLE RESPONDS TO FRG REQUEST (MADE BY BLECH TO
AARON, VEST AND BARTHOLOMEW LAST WEEK) FOR MORE DETAILED
STATEMENT OF CONSIDERATIONS THAT LED US TO FAVOR AN
A MS CONTROL LINKAGE OF THE ENHANCED RADIATION UARHEAD
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(ERW) AND THE SS-20 MISSILE. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO IMPROVE
THE PROSPECTS FOR A CLEAR DECISION FAVORING THE SS-20 LINK-
AGE AT THE FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR
MARCH 14, AS WELL AS NAILING DOWN FRG SUPPORT FOR OUR
OVERALL PACKAGE LOOKING TO MARCH 22 NAC. YOU SHOULD THUS
CONVEY THE POINTS IN ,ARAS 2 THROUGH 16 BELOW TO BLECH AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND ASK THAT HE PASS THEM ON TO VAN
-L AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED
TO LEAVE A "NON PAPER" ON THE ERW-20 LINK (PARAS 7-16)
WITH BLECH.

2. OVERALL APPROACH IN THE ALLIANCE. FRG PERMREP PAULS' STATEMENT FEBRUARY 28, ANNOUNCING FRG SUPPORT FOR OUR THREE-PART APPROACH AND URGING A PROMPT ALLIANCE DECISION, WAS EXTREMELY HELPFUL AND ENCOURAGING. WE CONCUR IN FRG JUDGMENT THAT THE NEXT NAC CONSULTATION ON ERW SHOULD BE CAREFULLY PREPARED IN ADVANCE, AND WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH BONN ON DETAILS. WE WANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO OUTLINE FURTHER OUR THINKING ON THE SCENARIO FOR THE NEXT NAC MEETING ON ERW, AND TO RESPOND MORE FULLY TO THE FRG REQUEST FOR THE ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT LED US TO FAVOR AN ARMS CONTROL LINKAGE BETWEEN THE ERW AND THE SS-20.

3. IDEALLY, WE WOULD LIKE THE NAC ON MARCH 22 TO CONCLUDE THIS PHASE OF ERW CONSULTATIONS IN A WAY THAT WOULD LET US PROCEED WITH PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR PRODUCTION DECISION DEPLOYMENT INTENTIONS, AND ARMS CONTROL APPROACH, COORDINATED WITH AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT OR AT LEAST ACQUIESCENCE ON THE PART OF THE ALLIES. TO ATTAIN THIS OBJECTIVE WE WILL NEED TO WORK EXTENSIVELY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY ON A BILATERAL BASIS WITH MANY OF THE OTHER ALLIES. A PARALLEL FRG BILATERAL EFFORT WOULD HELP TO ENSURE THE OUTCOME WE
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BOTH WANT. WE WILL COMMUNICATE FURTHER WITH THE FRG AS WE ENTER THE BILATERAL PHASE OF THE SCENARIO.

4. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT AN ALLIANCE STATEMENT EXPRESSING CONSENSUS ON ALL THREE ELEMENTS OF THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF OUR PROPOSAL BECAUSE IT IS A SINE QUA NON FOR THE ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE SOVIETS.

5. ACTION BY DUTCH PARLIAMENT MARCH 7 WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN A SATISFACTORY CONSENSUS STATEMENT ON ERW. WE BELIEVE THERE MAY STILL BE A CHANCE THAT DUTCH COULD REMAIN SILENT ON THE STATEMENT WE ENVISAGE, HOWEVER. IN ANY CASE WE WANT TO GIVE OUR CURRENT PLAN A FAIR RUN IN ORDER TO TEST ALLIANCE SENTIMENT, AND ENABLE THE NETHERLANDS (AND OTHERS) TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF HOW THE ALLIANCE IS LINING UP BEFORE MAKING A FINAL DECISION. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN FRG VIEWS ON THIS.

6. THE NATO STATEMENT ON ERW COULD TAKE THE FORM OF A COMMUNIQUE GIVING SYG LUNS' SUMMING UP OF THE ERW DISCUSSION AT THE MARCH 22 NAC. IT WOULD TAKE NOTE OF THE US PRODUCTION DECISION, ENDORSE THE ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL, AND EXPRESS THE COLLECTIVE VIEW THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL BE PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH DEPLOYMENT IF ARMS CONTROL FAILS. THIS FORMULA WOULD NOT REQUIRE THE ALLIES TO ACCEPT THE POLITICAL LIABILITIES OF CLEAR NATIONAL DECISIONS ON ERW DEPLOYMENT NOW, AND WOULD LEAVE ROOM FOR SOME RANGE OF

SEPARATE NATIONAL STATEMENTS ON ERW FOLLOWING THE ALLIANCE COMMUNIQUE. (WE WOULD WANT TO COORDINATE SUCH NATIONAL STATEMENTS THOROUGHLY BEFOREHAND.) WE ARE PREPARING AN ISSUSTRATIVE DRAFT CONSENSUS STATEMENT, AND WILL PROVIDE IT SHORTLY TO

THE FRG AND OTHER ALLIES.

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7. LINKAGE TO THE SS-20. OUTLINED BELOW ARE SOME OF THE FACTORS THAT LED THE US TO FAVOR LINKING ERW RESTRAINT TO SOVIET RESTRAINT ON DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20 MISSILE (AS OPPOSED TO OTHER POSSIBLE ARMS CONTROL TRADES). WE EN-VISAGE AN INCREASINGLY SPECIFIC STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS IN DEVELOPING OUR ARMS CONTROL ALTERNATIVE TO DEPLOYMENT. THE FIRST STEP WOULD BE A POLITICAL DECISION BY THE ALLIANCE PUTTING THE SOVIETS ON NOTICE THAT WE WOULD IN-SIST ON NON-DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20 IN RETURN FOR ERW NON-DEPLOYMENT. IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY AS PART OF THIS FIRST STEP TO ELABORATE A COMPLETE NEGOTIATING STRATEGY FOR ACH-IEVING THE ERW/SS-20 TRADE. THERE IS, IN FACT, SOME AD-VANTAGE IN REMAINING FLEXIBLE ABOUT PRECISE TERMS AND MECHANISMS FOR NOW.

8. POLITICAL RATIONALE FOR THE SS-20 LINK. THERE IS AL-READY A POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LINK BETWEEN ERW AND THE SS-20. BOTH ARE SEEN AS HIGHLY VISIBLE ELEMENTS OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION WHICH--IF DEPLOYED--WOULD AFFECT THE MILITARY POSTURE OF THE TWO SIDES. IN THE CASE OF ERW THIS PERCEPTION IS OVERDRAWN, BECAUSE OF MISAPPREHENSIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE WEAPON. BUT POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS OF ERW HAVE BECOME PART OF THE PROBLEM AND MUST BE DEALT WITH. THE SAME STATEMENT CAN BE APPLIED TO THE SS-20. THE HEAVY SOVIET PROPAGANDA EMPHASIS ON ERW GIVES IT MORE NEGOTIATING WEIGHT IN THE EYES OF OUR PUBLICS, IF NOT IN THE EYES OF THE SOVIETS, THAN IT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE .

9. AN ER/SS-20 CONNECTION, IN CONTRAST TO MBFR, WOULD HAVE THE VIRTUE OF SIMPLICITY AND PUBLIC UNDERSTANDABILITY. IT WOULD NOT REQUIRE AN ELABORATE NEGOTIATING STRATEGY. ACTIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED OF THE SOVIETS, NOT LENGTHY NEGO-SECRET

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TIATIONS. AND, WE COULD EASILY TELL WHETHER IT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED. WE WOULD JUDGE THE ADEQUACY OF SOVIET RESPONSE BY OBSERVING THEIR BEHAVIOR ON THE SS-20; IF THEY CONTINUE TO DEPLOY IT, THEY WILL HAVE EFFECTIVELY REJECTED OUR PRO-POSAL. IF WE WERE ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE OF RE-

STRAINT ON THESE TWO SYSTEMS, WE COULD MOVE LATER TOWARD THEIR INCLUSION IN MORE FORMALIZED AGREEMENTS. SEVERAL VARIANTS COULD BE EVALUATED BY THE ALLIANCE AND EXPLORED WITH THE SOVIETS: (A) A CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF DEPLOYED ERWS AND SS-20S; (B) A BAN ON DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEMS IN SPECIFIC AREAS; (C) A TOTAL BAN ON DEPLOYMENT OF THE TWO SYSTEMS ANYWHERE. WE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO CONSIDER SUCH QUESTIONS AS THE DEFINITION OF "DEPLOYMENT FOR ERW ON THE ONE HAND AND THE SS-20 ON THE OTHER HAND,

AND WE WOULD HAVE TO THINK ABOUT WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE MEASURES TO PREVENT THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET IRBMS SIMILAR TO THE SS-20

13. TACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF THE SS-20 LINK.

IT WOULD PLACE THE SOVIETS ON THE DEFENSIVE. THUS FAR, THE SOVIETS HAVE LED AN ACCUSATORY CAMPAIGN AGAINST WESTERN FORCE MODERNIZATION WHEN, IN FACT, THEY ARE PROCEEDING WITH FAR MORE THREATENING AND DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS PROGRAMS THAN ERW. PUTTING THE SPOTLIGHT ON THEIR ACTIVITIES--SPECIFICALLY ON THE SS-20--WILL DENY THEM THE UPPER HAND THEY HAVE BEEN SEEKING TO MAINTAIN PUBLICLY AND DIPLOMATICALLY.

14. THE ALLIANCE HAS A COMPELLING INTEREST IN DISPOSING OF THIS ISSUE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. AN ER/SS-20 PROPOSAL COULD BE MADE EARLY WITHOUT ENSNARING IT IN A COMPLEX AND POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE INTRA-ALLIANCE DEBATE. AS SUCH, WE COULD GAIN THE HIGH GROUND IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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15. IDENTIFYING THE SS-20 AS A PRIMARY CANDIDATE FOR ARMS CONTROL. THE PROPOSED LINKAGE WOULD SIGNAL THE SOVIETS CLEARLY AND UNMISTAKABLY THAT THE ALLIANCE PLACES THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON LIMITATION OF THIS SYSTEM. THIS WOULD REINFORCE OUR PROPOSAL TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON "GRAY AREA" SYSTEMS IN CONNECTION WITH SALT II.

16. DISADVANTAGES OF PUTTING ERU INTO MBFR. OUR ANALYSIS OF AN MBFR LINKAGE FOR ERW REVEALED SIGNIFICANT DISADVANTAGES:

-- PUTTING ERW INTO MBFR INTRODUCES QUALITATIVE ELEMENTS FOR THE FIRST TIME, WHICH WE HAVE OPPOSED IN THE PAST.

-- GETTING ALLIANCE CONSENSUS ON THE DETAILS OF AN MBFR OFFER--E.G., SHOULD WE DEMAND MORE TANKS? HOW MANY MORE?--WOULD PROBABLY TAKE MONTHS, BECAUSE OF THE COMPLEX ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED. THE ERW DEBATE WOULD DRAG ON THROUGH THE SSOD AND THE SUMMIT, WITH

PUBLIC CONTROVERSY MOUNTING AND NATO ON THE DEFENSIVE.

-- PUTTING ERW INTO MBFR WOULD NOT NECESSARILY RESOLVE THE ER ISSUE. THE SOVIETS COULD SIMPLY STALL, DOING JUST ENOUGH TO GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF BEING INTERESTED IN A TRADE. IN THIS EVENT, POLITICAL PRESSURE MIGHT MOUNT IN WESTERN COUNTRIES TO HOLD BACK THE ER PROGRAM SO AS NOT TO APPEAR TO BE NEGOTIATING IN BAD FAITH.

-- MBFR IS ALREADY COMPLEX. INJECTING THE ERW DEBATE INTO THAT FORUM WOULD PROBABLY COMPLICATE MATTERS FURTHER AND PLACE AN AGREEMENT FURTHER BEYOND OUR REACH THAN IT CURRENTLY APPEARS.

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-- INTRODUCTION OF ERW INTO MBFR ALSO WOULD STRENGTHEN SOVIET EFFORTS TO SEEK FURTHER EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS IN MBFR WHICH THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN WARY OF.

-- WE HOPE TO BREAK THE MBFR DEADLOCK AND MOVE INTO A PERIOD OF REAL NEGOTIATION BY TABLING THE INITIATIVE APPROVED BY THE ALLIANCE IN DECEMBER. INJECTING ERW INTO MBFR COULD CUT ACROSS THIS NEGOTIATING MOVE.

(IF ASKED AND ONLY IF ASKED WHETHER WE DID A DETAILED MILITARY TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS, YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN TO BLECH THAT NO DETAILED MILITARY TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MADE AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE A CONCLUSIVE MILITARY ANALYSIS IS FEASIBLE WITH THESE DISPARATE SYSTEMS. HOWEVER, WE DO BELIEVE A TRADE-OFF WITH THE SS-20 IS PREFERABLE TO ONE INVOLVING MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.) (SEE PARAS 6 AND 7 ABOVE)

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